Governing Artificial Intelligence Through Public–Private Partnerships: A Conceptual Framework for Balancing Innovation and Accountability 

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Dr. Aparna Marwah

Abstract

Public–private partnerships have emerged as the operating tool for the frontier artificial intelligence governance. Some states that don't have the computing power, talent or model access to assess advanced systems are contracting out that need to the companies that develop them, and the deal is often called a “tradeoff between innovation and accountability.” This concept paper does not accurately reflect what is being balanced. Classical partnership theory assumes that the public principal is competent, and he/she can define the service, check for its delivery, and renegotiate with an alternative supplier. The three assumptions of frontier AI governance are reversed in the public partner: They are unlikely to be able to define the safety themselves, they have no way to validate claims without the private partner's help, and they have no alternative source for the capability they need. The nature of the exchange is therefore not about risk in exchange for efficiency, as in an infrastructure partnership. Nonetheless, the responsibility for capability (not money) is what makes it show up on no balance sheet. The paper builds upon three constructs: capability asymmetry, verification dependence, and exit cost; and draws out its key dynamic: the high level of cooperation is voluntary and can be withdrawn at any time, for this reason, the level of public leverage is weakest at the times of highest suspicion, and the accountability is most available when most needed. There is a typology of four regimes between courtesy governance and sovereign verification and it situates current practice. For one reason alone, the two developments of 2025–2026, which go in opposite directions, are calibrated with the EU's binding high-risk regime being deferred, and the voluntary pre-deployment testing partnerships growing. The propositions and institutional design agenda are then presented. This paper is conceptual and does not contain any empirical data.

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Governing Artificial Intelligence Through Public–Private Partnerships: A Conceptual Framework for Balancing Innovation and Accountability . (2026). Journal of Engineering Innovation and Global Impact, 1(2), 14-27. https://doi.org/10.61705/jqha3g15

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